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 “‘These events grew from a policy aimed at the systematic destruction of a people… 
We are reminded of the capacity of people everywhere—not just in Rwanda, and certainly not 
just in Africa—but the capacity for people everywhere to slip into pure evil.  
We cannot abolish that capacity, but we must never accept it.’” 
—President Bill Clinton, Kigali, Rwanda (1998) 
 
 
I. Introduction  
Over a period of 100 days between April and mid-July of 1994, the Rwandan genocide claimed 
the lives of approximately 800,000 Rwandans and caused the displacement of an estimated two 
million refugees into surrounding nations (UNHCR). The eruption of fear, brutality, and violence 
as Rwandans massacred Rwandans stemmed from decades of civil war fueled by intractable 
existential, political, and socioeconomic conflicts between Tutsis and Hutus. 
After the genocide ended and the United Nations’ investigative task force began sifting 
through brutally macheted bodies in churches, stadiums, rivers and roadsides, the international 
community and policymakers began to ask what they could or should have done differently in 
international diplomacy to accurately assess the situation and prudentially intervene to prevent 
the genocide. In addition, Rwanda and the international community began to ask what justice 
meant for the survivors. The questions are still relevant today. 
April 6, 2021, marked the twenty-seventh anniversary of the genocide. Despite steps 
taken toward reconstruction, the wounds and scars in Rwanda remain. For foreign policymakers 
and practitioners engaged in diplomatic mediation or international development, Rwanda serves 
as a sobering case study. This paper will examine the response of the international community in 
1994, and analyze when, if ever, an intractable conflict is ripe for an apology (Crocker, 
Hampson, & Aall). For Tutsi and Hutu survivors, an apology will not restore the nearly 800,000 
lives lost, undo the years in exile, or erase the trauma suffered; the task of rebuilding the nation 
is, therefore, a weighty one in navigating policy and the day-to-day reality of those seeking 
healing and restoration. This paper will also examine what commitments or enforcement 
mechanisms must accompany an apology within the context of culture in order for reform to be 
sustainable in environments where violent conflict involved ethnic tensions, political interests, 
















II. Historical overview of country conditions and the genocide  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Rwanda (Source: Central Intelligence Agency) 
  
During the 20th century, the Central African country of Rwanda experienced significant ethnic, 
political, and socioeconomic turmoil and civil war. The country is highly agrarian, and to this 
day, most of Rwanda remains rural. In the late nineteenth century, Germany and Belgium 
colonized Rwanda. While Tutsis and Hutus formed the two main ethnic groups (the Twa are a 
minority group) and spoke the same language, both German and Belgian colonists unjustifiably 
favored the Tutsis by giving them access to better opportunities for education and government 
positions than their Hutu counterparts. In 1933, the distribution of identification cards by 
European colonists, registering Rwandans as Hutu or Tutsi, their “ethnic identity,” formalized 
the distinction between the two (Kamola, 2008, p. 64). The identification cards spared Tutsis 
from forced, hard labor, but did not do the same for Hutus (Kamola, 2008). 
By 1962, when Rwanda gained independence, the Tutsis and Hutus had developed 
mutual hatred and distrust and were fighting each other for social and political power. While 
France, Egypt, and the United States all had some democratic influence on Rwanda’s new 
political and economic systems as the country was gaining its footing, the divide between the 
two ethnic groups continued to widen, and civil war became a regular part of Rwandan life. In 
1959 and in 1962, Rwandan Tutsis fled to Uganda as refugees to escape violent uprisings of 
Hutu Rwandans. Settling in the Luwero triangle, north of the capital of Kampala, they held hopes 
of one day returning to Rwanda. In Uganda, however, Tutsi refugees faced continued cruelty 
from both Milton Obote’s and Idi Amin’s dictator regimes. When Uganda’s current-president 
Museveni led the Ugandan National Resistance Army in an uprising to overthrow Amin’s 
government in the late 1980s, children of the Rwandan refugees joined the resistance army. At 
the conclusion of the Ugandan war, they formed the Rwandan Patriotic Forces (RPF) with the 
hopes of one day returning to their native land and regaining power.  
Meanwhile, Rwanda was on a path toward a corrupt one-party state with the Party for the 
Emancipation of the Hutus extracting public funds, enforcing party-oriented civil service, 
coinciding with rising poverty, and systemic discrimination shown against Tutsis. During the 
1960s, occasional organized massacres became a regime tactic breeding fear throughout the 
country in an effort to maintain Hutu control. In 1973, universities purged Tutsis. As violence 
between the two ethnic groups in Rwanda continued, the army’s Hutu chief of staff, Juvénal 
Habyarimana, staged a coup d’état as a tactical performance in appearing to restore order and 
 
unity to Rwanda through his party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development. It 
soon became apparent, however, that Habyarimana’s motive was to gain power. His plan 
succeeded, and Habyarimana became president of Rwanda, establishing Hutu control in the 
country. In the years that followed, the Hutu elite grew, while the economic condition of the 
nation worsened, and the Tutsi minority became more impoverished as they were blamed for the 
country’s deteriorating condition.  
In 1990, the Tutsi-RPF staged an offensive in an attempt to gain control. The 
Habyarimana regime responded by fanning flames of fear and hatred against the Tutsis. In 
February 1993, the RPF began advancing toward Kigali, but the French government provided 
troops to intervene on behalf of Habyarimana’s government. To assist in peacekeeping efforts 
during the Arusha Accords (the official peace agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front), the United Nations peacekeeping forces, 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) arrived in Rwanda. Their purpose 
was clear: peacekeeping and not military intervention.  
On January 11, 1994, the United Nations (U.N.) force commander in Rwanda, Major 
General Roméo Dallaire, sent a cable to New York, warning the U.N. that mass killings were 
allegedly being planned by Habyarimana’s regime. General Dallaire requested permission to act 
after an informant told Dallaire of 1,700 mostly Hutu rebels located outside of the capital of 
Kigali and trained to kill Tutsis. In response to this cable, Kofi Annan, the head of U.N. 
peacekeeping, instructed General Dallaire:  
Inform the President [of Rwanda] that you have received apparently reliable 
information concerning the activities of the Interhamwe militia which represents a 
clear threat to the peace process. You should inform him that these activities 
include the training and deployment of subversive groups in Kigali as well as the 
storage and distribution of weapons to these groups (Fisanick, 2004, p. 10). 
In hindsight, this response was a mistake; the world would later learn that some of President 
Habyarimana’s own family members were extremists and had helped instigate and plan the 
genocide.  
On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundian 
president Cyprien Ntaryamira from a negotiation session in Arusha was shot down outside of the 
Kigali airport, killing both presidents. In a declassified U.S. Department of State intelligence 
report dated April 7, an unidentified source informed U.S. ambassador David Rawson that 
“rogue Hutu elements of the military—possibly the elite presidential guard—were responsible 
for shooting down the plane” (U.S. Department of State, para 1). 
That same day, Radio Mille Collines, a privately-owned radio station with financial ties 
to Habyarimana and Hutu extremist members of his family, began calling for the killing of Tutsis 
(Fisanick, p. 21). The hate propaganda continued for weeks, as the radio station called on Hutus 
to defend Rwanda against the invasion of the “inyenzi,” or “cockroaches” (Fisanick, p. 21). 
Within hours of the president’s assassination, mass killings throughout Rwanda began. On April 
7, the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) and Interhamwe Hutu militia began killing Tutsis and 
moderate Hutu politicians. The U.N. peacekeeping forces were given an official mandate not to 
intervene. When ten Belgian soldiers were murdered, the U.N. and Belgium considered 
removing troops from Rwanda.  
On April 8, the Tutsi RPF attempted to liberate 600 of its troops in Kigali. That same day, 
United States president Bill Clinton issued a statement, saying he was “shocked and deeply 
saddened…[I] condemn these actions and I call on all parties to cease any such actions 
 
immediately,” and assured the families of U.S. citizens in Rwanda that efforts were being made 
to secure their safety (PBS Frontline). Between April 9-10, the French, Belgian, and U.S. 
governments removed their citizens from Rwanda, and on April 14, Belgium withdrew 
peacekeeping forces. On April 21, the U.N. Security Council voted to reduce its peacekeeping 
force from 2,500 to 270 (PBS Frontline). On May 3, President Clinton, who was hesitant to act 
in the wake of the events that had occurred in Somalia, signed a Presidential Decision Directive 
to review United States peacekeeping policies and programs, limiting U.S. military involvement 
in international peacekeeping operations (Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25). 
By mid-May, the International Red Cross estimated that over 500,000 Rwandans had 
been murdered (Fisanick, p. 133). Yet, between May and June of 1994, neither the U.S. 
government nor any other country issued a clear statement identifying the atrocities as acts of 
genocide. On May 17, the U.N. agreed to deploy 5,500 troops to Rwanda, but disagreements 
regarding who was responsible for paying for the costs of deployment delayed the troops. On 
May 19, the U.N. asked the United States to provide 50 armored personnel carriers, but financial 
disagreements again delayed action (PBS Frontline).  
On June 22, the French government conducted Operation Turquoise by deploying its 
forces in Rwanda and securing an area. By mid-July, the RPF’s Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) 
secured Kigali and brought an end to the genocide. The Hutu government fled, along with 
thousands of Hutu refugees. The RPF then established a government in Kigali (PBS Frontline). 
Over a period of just 100 days, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were murdered, in addition to 
the Rwandans killed by disease and murder in refugee camps (Fisanick). 
 
III. The nature of the Rwandan conflict made it intractable 
In Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases, Crocker, Hampson, & Aall 
(2004) describe what constitutes an “intractable conflict:”  
Intractable conflicts have a number of salient characteristics. In the first place, 
they are typically long-standing, having lasted for years, possibly decades. As a 
consequence, they are conflicts where psychological wounds and a sense of 
grievance and victimization run very deep…Intractable conflicts are also 
characterized either by frequent bursts of violence or, if there is a temporary 
cessation of the violence, by a failure by the parties to leave the danger zone of 
potential renewal of violence (p.7). 
The conflict in Rwanda fits these criteria. The conflict was intractable because it was existential. 
The two main ethnic groups, who were neighbors and families, became pitted against the other 
through violence and hatred, frequent civil wars, and country expulsion as the Tutsis became 
refugees in neighboring countries. “To most in the international community, the words ‘Tutsi’ 
and ‘Hutu’…were synonymous with tribal slaughter” (Fisanick, p. 18)  
The conflict in Rwanda was also political. After decades of Tutsis and Hutus vying for 
power and control over the other, Rwanda’s government had become increasingly corrupt under 
Habyarimana’s regime. The attempt to merge the Tutsi and Hutu military and reduce the power 
of the presidency through the Arusha Peace Accord negotiations was the fuse that led to the 
powder-keg of the genocide lighting and erupting. Today, the Rwandan president is Tutsi.1 
 
1 Paul Kigame led the RPF against the Hutu militia during the genocide. Arguably, Rwanda would not exist as a 
nation today without Kigame’s efforts and warfare conduct (The Economist). After the genocide ended in July 1994, 
Kigame became vice president of Rwanda, and in 2000, was elected president. His economic reforms are exemplary, 
and first impressions of Rwanda’s recovery after the genocide seem admirable on the surface. However, Human 
 
While slightly more integrated, the government in Rwanda swings back and forth between the 
two ethnicities with authoritarian governance.  
Finally, the conflict in Rwanda was intractable because it was socioeconomic: “One of 
the most often-cited causes of the conflict is Rwanda’s endemic structural poverty (Fisanick, p. 
101). By 1986, coffee exports accounted for 82 percent of Rwanda’s total income (Kamola, p. 
67). As the price of coffee plummeted in 1989, however, due to a failure to renegotiate the 
International Coffee Agreement, political unrest in Rwanda worsened as the Tutsis were blamed 
for the deteriorating economic conditions. In that setting, the poor became poorer (Kamola). 
Protecting the vulnerable from violence requires an economy in which security is both available 
and affordable. For policymakers involved in international development, this is a critical 
component. 
 
IV. The international community coalition and the types of intervention third 
parties considered in responding to the events in Rwanda in 1994 
Crocker, Hampson, & Aall (2004) identify three types of “substantive rationales” for when states 
or interstate groupings may wish to intervene or engage in mediation in intractable conflicts: (1) 
humanitarian reasons; (2) strategic geopolitical reasons; or (3) reasons involving regional 
security or governance. In 1994, Rwandans committed acts of mass carnage with the specific 
intent of destroying the other ethnic group. While Western diplomatic efforts, including 
negotiation and mediation are valid options to consider, specific circumstances—the type of 
conflict and the stage the conflict is in—must determine whether or not mediation or negotiation 
are appropriate methods or if there is some other alternative that is more appropriate given the 
particularities of the situation.  
By the time the Arusha Accords were pursued, the plans for genocide were already being 
developed. Due to the type and stage of the conflict’s development, the window for negotiation 
and mediation without the leverage of power through greater military presence—not merely 
peacekeeping—had already closed. Recognizing the conflict as intractable, however, was not a 
barrier to intervention for humanitarian reasons. The international community recognized this but 
fell short by delegating the task to the United Nations. When it became apparent that the 
Interhamwe were slaughtering the Tutsis, rather than immediately respond by sending troops to 
intervene, the U.N., the Security Council, and democratic countries argued over who was 
responsible for bearing the costs.  
Belgium and France were interested in seeing the ethnic, political, and socioeconomic 
tensions resolve due to their historical and continued entanglements with Rwanda. The United 
States did not necessarily have anything at stake in promoting peacebuilding in Rwanda; yet on 
the international stage, the United States is the most powerful democracy with a Declaration 
stating, “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights,” and held the strongest leverage capabilities. The “Somalia Syndrome” and 
the ramifications and risks of sending troops in cannot be easily dismissed as a valid reason for 
the U.S. to weigh carefully its military engagement in Rwanda, but an argument should have 
 
Rights Watch notes that Kigame’s method of an authoritarian, fear-driven government with restrictions on freedom 
of speech and politics, his state-sponsored media, use of unlawful detention centers, and reports of torture are 
troubling (Human Rights Watch). President Kigame’s use of authoritarian government is a symptom of an 
underlying conflict between two groups which the genocide may not have eradicated. 
 
been made that the acts were genocide and not civil war, and therefore demanded earlier 
international intervention.2  
The international community had a duty to stop the Rwandan genocide and assist in 
reconstruction, and the following paragraphs will explain why. In 1994, there were several 
options which the international community considered, some of which they implemented: (a) 
attempt to negotiate or mediate the conflict; (b) ignore the situation; (c) intervene with military 
presence; or (d) establish criminal tribunals and courts of law: 
 
A. Option one: Negotiation or mediation between the Tutsis and Hutus  
One of the challenging tasks in foreign policy is discerning what tools of diplomacy are 
appropriate and necessary, their window of viability, and who the third parties are who may have 
political, geographic, or economic interests at stake in resolving the conflict. This author argues 
that negotiation was not an appropriate tool in Rwanda due to the underlying existential, 
political, and socioeconomic challenges constituting intractable conflicts. By the time of the 
Arusha Accords, decades of violence between two ethnic groups marked Rwanda’s history. The 
negotiation approach of focusing on the interests and not positions of both ethnic groups as 
espoused by some in the field of international diplomacy (Fisher and Ury, 2011) would have 
only worked if there was also an enforcement mechanism and a strong mediator presence to 
address the balance of power in the polarized conflict zone (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2004). 
     Even if there had been an enforcement mechanism and mediator presence, mediation 
would not have been sufficient for stopping the genocide. The UNAMIR’s peacebuilding 
mandate proved useless in April 1994. During the Arusha Accords, ongoing threats to withdraw 
the U.N.’s presence in order to force compliance in Rwanda held little leverage because that is 
exactly what Hutu extremists wanted (PBS Frontline). Due to its history of civil war, ethnic 
violence in Rwanda was expected, and it is possible that policymakers and governments did not 
fully realize the seriousness of genocidal intent on the ground or the power-keg of violence that 
was about to explode. In that setting, mediation in Rwanda would only have worked for a limited 
purpose and alongside vigorous military enforcement to contain and quell the violence. Only 
after establishing a military presence and stopping the violence, could Rwandan leaders and the 
international community analyze whether or not mediation was even possible at that time. 
Pursuing negotiations or mediation in 1993-1994 without serious enforcement mechanisms or 
mediators with leverage (such as the United States and a coalition of nations) present was a 
diplomatic failure.  
 
B. Option two: Ignore or fail to define the escalating situation  
Ignoring the escalating situation as simply another civil war was the gravest mistake on the part 
of the international community. The U.N. secretary-general’s special representative in Rwanda at 
the time of the genocide, Mr. Shaharyar M. Kahn, argued that the international community 
should have detected the early warning signs and taken preemptive action (Fisanick, p. 67), and 
that the international community was not without warning since the United States, Belgium, and 
France were “fielding desperate appeals from Rwandans to maintain a diplomatic presence” 
(Lynch, 2015). Yet, Rwanda was a country where no one wanted to take the lead but still felt that 
an institution needed to be present for humanitarian purposes; hence, U.N. involvement: “[t]he 
United Nations stepped in to help implement the 1993 Arusha [A]ccords, while the Western 
 
2 To his credit, Bill Clinton later stated that the failure to intervene in Rwanda was one of his greatest regrets as 
president of the United States (Lynch, 2015). 
 
powers maintained a hands-off watching brief, and Rwanda became a ward of the system” 
(Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, p. 61). When the situation in Rwanda began to deteriorate, rather 
than provide a rapid response specifically tailored to the developing circumstances, the 
international community withdrew its diplomatic presence and relied on U.N. peacekeeping 
rather than military intervention. Crocker, Hampson, & Aall (2004) argued that “the U.N. system 
itself [thereby] created conditions for the wholesale slaughter” (p. 61).  
     A likely reason why the international community ignored the situation stemmed from 
the failure to distinguish the killings as genocide instead of civil war, which would have carried 
legal consequences and demanded action. In 1944, Polish lawyer Raphäel Lemkin coined the 
word, “genocide,” with the Greek prefix “genos” (“race” or “tribe”) and the Latin suffix “cide” 
(“killing”) (U.N. Office on Genocide Prevention quoting Lemkin). In 1946, the United Nations 
General Assembly recognized genocide as a crime under international law. The 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide codified genocide as an independent 
crime and defined genocide in Article II of the Convention as: 
…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as: 
a. Killing members of the group; 
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Legal principles of international law and the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm for 
States that have ratified the Convention. Yet, at the time of the Rwandan genocide, civil war 
between the Hutus and Tutsis was a regular occurrence in Rwanda, and many argue that the 
available intelligence coming out of Rwanda was unclear that the violence had evolved into 
genocide. If the genocide had been labeled what it, in fact, was, the international community 
could not have ignored it: 
If the United Nations, the United States, and other Western nations had admitted 
at the time that the killings were in fact genocide, then they would have had to 
commit money and troops to stop them. For this reason, official representatives 
were extremely careful in using the term. Genocide is not simply a label but a 
legal term with legal consequences (Fisanick, p. 13, emphasis added). 
     The international media silence on the mass killings occurring in Rwanda is stunning. 
Most foreign journalists had evacuated the country, and what little media coverage remained 
focused on Kigali, and not the rural areas where Rwandans were being slaughtered hourly. It was 
not until the end of the second week that Human Rights Watch even raised the prospect of 
genocide to the U.N. Security Council. The New York Times questioned whether the events in 
Rwanda constituted genocide, which reveals the key role media may have in bringing issues to 
policymakers who must then decide whether to act or “explain their inaction” (Crocker, 
Hampson, & Aall, p. 81). Nevertheless, while a combination of possible civil war, the 
withdrawal of U.S. diplomats and journalists, and the lies of extremists in the Rwandan 
government may have obscured the genocidal intent driving the killings in Rwanda, there were 
communications from those on-site, including Dallaire’s cable and individuals with contacts in 
the country, that provided enough information of the massacre to arguably justify sending 
military troops to intervene in Rwanda.  
 
 
C. Option three: Intervene by establishing a military presence to stop the violence 
It is this author’s argument that military intervention to isolate and stop the violence is the option 
which the international community should have exercised immediately and failed to do. Without 
holding the perpetrators accountable, genocidal violence could continue with impunity. In his 
firsthand account, General Henry Anyidoho, a Ghanaian officer who was serving as the second-
highest ranking peacekeeper with the U.N. in Rwanda, said when the diplomatic community left 
Rwanda, the violence escalated: “Once the killers knew there was no referee, they had a free 
hand to do whatever they wanted” (Lynch, emphasis added).  
 
The United States 
When a National Security Council staffer called U.S. ambassador Joyce Leader after her 
evacuation from Kigali to ask the question, “Short of sending in the troops, what is to be done?,” 
Leader responded, “Send in the troops” (Power, 2001). The events occurring in Rwanda 
undermined American values, and intervening was low risk to the United States. Nevertheless, 
the United States’ hesitation in pursuing peacekeeping efforts was understandable following 
recent efforts to provide mediation and reconciliation assistance in Somalia (U.S. Department of 
State, 2019). While the United States voted in the Security Council to authorize Dallaire and the 
UNAMIR’s presence in Rwanda, U.S. enthusiasm for the U.N efforts was waning, and the 
country made it clear that it would not send its troops to Rwanda (Power, 2001). 
 [I]n the words of an April 17 [1994] Washington Post editorial, ‘The United 
States has no recognizable national interest in taking a role, certainly not a leading 
role.’ Capitol Hill was quiet. Some in Congress were glad to be free of the 
expense of another flawed UN mission. Others, including a few members of the 
Africa subcommittees and the Congressional Black Caucus, eventually appealed 
tamely for the United States to play a role in ending the violence—but again, they 
did not dare urge U.S. involvement on the ground, and they did not kick up a 
public fuss. Members of Congress weren’t hearing from their constituents 
(Fisanick, p. 83). 
This decision not to send troops highlights the balance in policy debates between national 
interests and humanitarian consequences as a critical lesson for policymakers studying Rwanda. 
There was a legitimate question as to why American troops should intervene as a matter of 
national interest and economic policy. However, foreign policy assumes that it is in the national 
interest of the United States to provide leadership and exercise the use of diplomatic power when 
human rights are threatened around the world for the sake of influencing international decisions 
that could, ultimately, impact America’s own national security and the lives of Americans. In her 
2001 article on the Rwandan genocide published in The Atlantic, former U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations, Samantha Power argued that, in hindsight, the U.S. could have agreed to the 
Belgian pleas for U.N. reinforcement before Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. President 
Clinton could have deployed U.S. troops to Rwanda, where they could have either joined the 
UNAMIR forces or, with the Security Council’s backing, U.S. troops could have acted 
unilaterally, as France did with Operation Turquoise in July of 1994. Power also argued that the 
United States could have done what it did five years later in Kosovo and acted without the 
U.N.’s blessing because what appeared to be a genocide was underway. When it was clear that 
the violence was escalating, humanitarian consequences should have outweighed national 
interests for U.S. policymakers.  
 
The United Nations commanding general in Rwanda initially claimed that had the United 
States deployed 5,000 troops in April 1994, the genocide would have been prevented, and this 
claim has been repeated often by the United States Congress and human rights groups 
(Kuperman, 2000). In his Foreign Affairs article, Rwanda in Retrospect, Alan J. Kuperman 
(2000) argued that due to lack of information, the earliest that President Clinton could have 
credibly determined genocide was occurring in Rwanda, thereby prompting U.S. action, was not 
until the end of April, nearly two weeks after the violence had begun. Rightly or wrongly, 
Kuperman argued that by the end of April, a significant majority of the slaughter had already 
occurred (approximately 250,000 Rwandans). Even if President Clinton had sent troops 
immediately, it would have taken at least one week to respond. By then, Kuperman argued, the 
vast majority of the murders would have already occurred. Had the United States deployed 
troops immediately, it would have taken several days to contain the genocide. However, it likely 
would have made a difference in terms of lives lost; this was a situation where the United States 
gambled on the wrong side of probability theory in foreign policy.  
 
The United Nations  
In an interview with Frontline, Iqbal Riza, chief of staff to U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan, 
responded to charges that the U.N. did not prevent the genocide despite having advance warning. 
Riza pointed to the military losses the U.S. had recently suffered in Somalia as one of the main 
reasons the U.N. did not act. Riza also said, “We have to go by the mandate that we are given by 
the [U.N.] Security Council” (Fisanick, p. 70). Finally, Riza noted that political will to intervene, 
which was vital to the international community’s response, was lacking:  
If the political will had been there, it should have been to strengthen the mission, 
give it a stronger mandate and try to stop these killings. Instead, the strongest 
contingent was immediately withdrawn and the Security Council put the decision 
to reduce this mission to less than 10% of its size (Fisanick, p. 70). 
In The Atlantic, Power (2001) wrote that “[T]he crisis was treated as a civil war requiring a 
cease-fire or as a ‘peace-keeping problem’ requiring a U.N. withdrawal. It was not treated as a 
genocide demanding instant action.” Fisanick quotes Shaharyar M. Kahn, who said: 
The lesson of Rwanda is clear: we must build the international political will, as 
well as an enhanced U.N. capability, for prevention. The U.N. should develop its 
ability for gathering and analyzing information, for making early warnings and for 
rapid reaction through deployment of troops as well as diplomatic creative 
initiatives (p. 62). 
It is questionable whether the U.N. had the appropriate leverage and military strength to 
stop the genocide. The U.N. certainly had opportunity to respond, but resorted to deliberating 
about financial costs, which seems insignificant in comparison to the loss of human life that 
followed. 
 
D. Option four: Establish criminal tribunals and courts of law to hold perpetrators 
accountable (The United Nations’ International Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania) 
Following the genocide, the new Tutsi-Rwandan government desired that the international 
community would help capture war criminals and then turn them over to the Rwandan courts. 
Instead, the U.N. established a criminal tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, to prosecute the most 
prominent génocidaires. While Rwandan courts impose the death penalty, the U.N. criminal 
 
tribunal for Rwanda does not, and it quickly became clear that despite some convictions, the 
United Nations was failing in bringing justice to Rwanda.  
Over the years, the international court has successfully convicted many of the genocide’s 
perpetrators as an act of the international community recognizing the atrocities done. For some 
Rwandans, however, the sentences have not been harsh enough. In 1997, an internal 
investigation conducted by the U.N. found that “‘not a single administrative area functioned 
effectively’ in the tribunal’s administrative branch” (Fisanick, p. 129). When Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, a Hutu extremist and one of the founders of the propaganda-filled Radio Mille 
Collines, was finally captured in Cameroon in March 1996, he was not sent to Arusha until 
November 1997. In November of 1999, the U.N. Rwanda tribunal ordered that Barayagwiza be 
freed for having been detained for so long without being charged (Fisanick, p. 128). As a result, 
the Rwandan government stopped cooperating with the U.N. criminal tribunal.  
 The public justice system in Rwanda is not without its own internal challenges and 
corruption—after the genocide, there were reports in 1998 of defendants being tried without 
counsel and the execution of 22 convicts in public stadiums to cheering crowds (Fisanick, p. 
129). Without accountability, angry retaliation and justice without mercy lies just beneath the 
surface when the fractures of genocide divide a nation. 
 
V. The lessons of Rwanda for policymakers and international development 
programs 
In March 1998, President Clinton visited Rwanda and spoke at the Kigali airport. In what would 
become known as the “Clinton apology,” he said:  
The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share 
of responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the 
killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe 
haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful 
name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything 
in our power to help you build a future without fear, and full of hope...To that 
end, I am directing my administration to improve, with the international 
community, our system for identifying and spotlighting nations in danger of 
genocidal violence, so that we can assure worldwide awareness of impending 
threats....Secondly, we must as an international community have the ability to act 
when genocide threatens...Third, we must work now to remedy the consequences 
of genocide….Fourth, to help ensure that those who survived in the generations to 
come never again suffer genocidal violence, nothing is more vital than 
establishing the rule of law...We will also continue to pursue justice through our 
strong backing for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda...Fifth, we 
must make it clear to all those who would commit such acts in the future that they 
too must answer for their acts, and they will. In Rwanda, we must hold 
accountable all those who may abuse human rights, whether insurgents or 
soldiers. Internationally, as we meet here, talks are underway at the United 
Nations to establish a permanent international criminal court’” (Fisanick, pp. 91-
94). 
The international community’s failure to define the killings as genocide and prudentially 
intervene using appropriate diplomatic measures was a foreign policy failure. The specific 
circumstances of Rwanda’s underlying intractable conflicts meant that negotiation was not a 
 
truly valid option. Negotiation would have had the semblance of establishing peace on the 
surface, but the façade would not have been realistic nor sustainable because it did not address 
the underlying existential issues. Instead, when it became clear in January 1994 that plans for 
ethnic killing were underway, the international community should have intervened at that time 
by establishing a strong military presence to contain and stop the violence and allow for the 
international community to then further assess the situation to determine which diplomatic tools 
were appropriate moving forward given the circumstances and the interests and parties involved. 
Assessing the situation at that stage would have required close examination of the power 
balances and the willingness of the parties to mediate and make substantive concessions 
regarding the existential, political, and socioeconomic conflicts. The international community 
would have needed to produce a mediator or coalition of mediators holding both leverage 
capabilities and long-term enforcement capacity (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall).                  
For policymakers involved in peacebuilding, mediation, or international development, 
Rwanda also provides lessons on how to move a nation toward reconciliation. Order matters. To 
ensure that the conditions for genocide do not ripen in Rwanda again, certain safeguards in the 
public justice system must be established. While the international community has a role in 
providing safeguards through accountability and international pressure, Rwandans must lead in 
order for reform to be sustainable. Analyzing the applicability, timing, and culture of an apology 
also matters in rebuilding the nation. The genocide occurred as a result of Rwandans killing 
Rwandans. The Rwandans must determine when peacebuilding and reconstruction can wholly 
begin; any act or pressure from the international community toward reconciliation without justice 
for the survivors of genocide is premature: 
While most international organizations and NGOs list national reconciliation as 
one of their goals, and even the government has established the National 
Committee of Unity and Reconciliation, this terminology often falls flat with 
many Rwandans, particularly with genocide survivors. In Rwandan culture, 
reconciliation has a specific meaning that is not necessarily the meaning implied 
by outsiders using the term. To most Rwandans, reconciliation is something that 
occurs between two individuals, a process by which the wronged individual 
physically takes the hand of the person who committed the wrongdoing, and, as 
an individual, forgives him/her for his/her action. When speaking of 
reconciliation, international organizations and NGOs sometimes give the 
impression that they expect survivors of the genocide to directly forgive the 
individuals who murdered their families and loved ones, even if this not their 
intended message. Genocide survivors speak of the need for justice before 
reconciliation, for prosecution of the crimes of genocide that took the lives of 
nearly a million people (Margalit, 2009, pp. 109-110, emphasis added). 
 
A. Rwanda today: Reconciliation and rebuilding 
In April of 2018, I traveled to Kigali, Rwanda, to see where the genocide had occurred. It was 
the 24th anniversary, and the entire capital city was somber and quiet. Many businesses were 
closed, and the clean, quiet streets were almost an eerie juxtaposition to the streets I had just left 
in a neighboring East African country. It was hard to believe that the same manicured streets I 
was walking on had been streets of slaughter; it seemed unnatural—as though everything had 
been wiped clean on the surface in an effort to forget.  
 
I saw the home of President Juvénal Habyarimana, including the study where his Hutu 
extremist family members plotted the genocide, the remains of his plane that had been shot 
down, Hotel des Mille Collines, some of the stadiums around the city where Rwandans had 
hidden, the Campaign Against Genocide Museum, and the Kigali Genocide Memorial. One of 
the most moving moments of my life, however, occurred when I visited Ntarama Church 
(pictured below), a site where several thousand Rwandans had gathered to hide only to be 
brutally massacred by machete.  
 
Even 24 years later, the atmosphere of that place was still palpable. I took a seat on a pew 
next to a Rwandan woman whom I had never met before, and she was weeping with a heaviness 
I was not familiar with. We did not speak the same language, but deeply moved, I reached over, 
and we held hands as she wept her deep, silent tears; 24 years later, and she still had tears to 
weep. Along the wall next to us was a case that held the skulls of men, women, and children who 
had been killed in Ntarama Church—many of the skulls had missing pieces where the machete 
had brutally crushed through.  
In visiting the Kigali Genocide Memorial, where 250,000 people are interred, I walked 
alongside Tutsi and Hutu Rwandans through an exhibit tracing the genocide and found a wall 
where the names of some of the identified victims had been engraved (pictured above). As part 
of the exhibit’s conclusion, orphaned Tutsis and Hutus, who all had personal stories of surviving 
the genocide, had created a video calling for forgiveness, reconciliation, and reconstruction as a 
country of united Rwandans.    
Recalling the clean streets of Kigali, and how strange it seemed, it is important that 
reconciliation and reconstruction does not simply wipe away the reality of the Tutsis and Hutus 
living alongside one another without addressing underlying matters of justice. Like the woman in 
the pew, there may still be tears to weep. However, neither the government nor the opposition 
can be a mechanism for angry retaliation and ethnic hatred; the intractable conflicts must be dealt 
with if any reform is to be sustainable and effective at deterring genocide from occurring again. 
Rwanda today continues to face challenges in civil and political rights and human rights 
abuses. According to Human Rights Watch, the Rwandan Patriotic Front exerts total control over 
the political space (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Those who criticize or oppose the government 
Ntarama Church (below) and the Kigali 
Genocide Memorial Wall with the names of 
victims (right). Photographs by Emily 
Milnes (2018). 
 
publicly have either disappeared or have been found dead. Freedom of expression is limited, and 
pro-government views dominate the print and broadcast media. While many of the people 
responsible for the genocide have since been brought to justice, the Human Rights Watch found 
in 2020 that detention centers are places of intimidation, ill-treatment, and torture to extract 
confessions (Human Rights Watch). While the current Tutsi government of Rwanda may view 
Hutu civic action with suspicion as a result of a Hutu government incubating the genocide, it is 
important to remember that colonial disenfranchisement of Hutus created the conditions for 
ethnic hostility. Tutsi leaders must view Hutu participation in governance and civic discourse not 
as a threat of renewed extremism, but rather as a way to break the cycle of ethnic violence.  
Part of bringing justice to survivors and bringing order to a nation to ensure that the 
horrors of genocide do not occur again must involve strengthening the public justice system to 
protect the vulnerable from violence. One political party or one ethnic group cannot dominate the 
public justice system or stifle the other. Implementing reform in the public justice system by 
removing corruption in government, the judiciary, and the police service, and reforming the laws 
of Rwanda would allow for freedom of political association and freedom of speech. Removing 
corruption means that the most vulnerable in Rwanda know that the government and public 
justice system is blind to ethnicity, and Rwandans are treated equally by the government and 
governing institutions.  
In implementing reform and addressing the underlying intractable conflicts, two things 
are necessary: (1) the exercise of visionary Rwandan leadership so that change is sustainable; 
and (2) a mechanism with leverage and power, whether it is a nation, a coalition, or an 
institution, in place to oversee transition and reform to ensure that Rwandans exercising their 
rights will not face threats of violence or acts of violence. The challenge with this model is 
national sovereignty. The leadership of Rwanda is likely to naturally resist submitting to 
accountability. Rwanda had pressure to negotiate and reform its government structure from a 
watching international community before. What was lacking in 1993-1994 was the presence of a 
strong enforcer—the UNAMIR was weakened by its peacebuilding mandate and lack of follow-
through. When rumors of plans for mass killings were surfacing, the international coalition 
should have, at that time, reassessed the situation and sent troops in. Instead, the international 
community failed to discern the timing, the stage of the conflict, and the wrong tools of 
diplomacy were used at the wrong time. In looking to the future and exerting international 
pressure and accountability while applying lessons learned from history, the United States or 
another democratic nation or coalition of African countries may yet have a role to play in 
Rwanda. Policymakers and those engaged in international development would do well to study 
the history, successes and failures of foreign policy in nations marked by ongoing intractable 
conflict to better understand where gaps lie and how to address challenges for purposes of 
sustainable reconstruction and reconciliation in Rwanda. 
In addition to introducing new reforms to the public justice system as an enforcement 
mechanism to prevent genocide, the time may also be ripe for an apology, which would give 
credible weightiness to the reforms as Rwandans lead in building their nation. Joseph 
Ndereyimana, a Hutu refugee who fled Rwanda after the genocide ended, believes an apology is 
now finally appropriate: “[i]t is my belief, as a Hutu, that the time has come for us to approach 
all those Tutsis who survived and apologize: to say sorry for keeping quiet, and for not 
promoting peace. I believe that only Rwandans are able to find solutions to the problems in their 
country, because they alone are familiar with the roots of these issues” (Fisanick, pp. 88-89).  
 
While in Rwanda in 2018, I spoke with college-age Rwandans—both Tutsis and Hutus—
and it seemed that the next generation wishes to move forward. The international community, 
and specifically the United States, must examine its response to the Rwandan genocide to 
determine policies and plans in anticipation of genocide occurring in other troubled regions of 
the world. The international community must not be caught by surprise as it was by Rwanda. It is 
imperative that Rwandan leaders, mediators and peacebuilders, and those involved in 
international development in Rwanda listen to survivors and learn from them. Organizations 
working with Rwandan’s youth may consider investing in pilot projects modeled after the Rotary 
Club’s Cypress Friendship Program, pairing Hutu and Tutsi youth and giving them opportunity 
to share about their life in their country and their experience with the goal of fostering peace as a 
result of identifying shared interests instead of positions of conflict (Rotarian Action Group for 
Peace). If the conflict in Rwanda is, in fact, ripe for an apology, if the affected parties do, in fact, 
want that, the key will be determining how to apologize and institute long-term changes in the 
public justice system and government that will sustain the apology and ensure that genocide does 
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